China: From “Fast Follower” to Supplier of New Drugs

Record licensing deals, accelerating innovation and rising geopolitical risks reshape global biopharma partnerships

Perspective
Author(s)
Michel Le Bars
Date
17/11/2026

In our Healthcare & Lifesciences Report 2026, we described China as the world’s second biopharma innovation hub and the main external source of new drugs for Western pharma. In 2025 alone, Chinese companies signed more than 150 out-licensing deals worth over USD 135bn. Ten months into 2026, we revisit that view: the fundamentals, this year’s dealmaking, how value is shared between Chinese licensors and Western partners, the rising political risk on both sides of the Pacific, and what it means for European pharma and investors.

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Key Takeaways

  1. China is the #2 innovation hub: confirmed.
    Record domestic approvals, nearly half of all new molecules entering human trials, and a new five-year plan that targets a quarter of the world’s first-in-class drugs by 2030.
  2. Chinese companies develop fast, Western partners handle late-stage and commercial: confirmed.
    Almost every large 2026 deal follows this model. Growing US pressure for clinical data relevant to US patients reinforces it.
  3. Licensing deals will keep growing: strongly confirmed.
    By early October, Chinese out-licensing had reached USD 139.4bn, already above 2025’s full-year record. Chinese assets now account for 58% of global licensing deal value, up from 48% in 2025.
  4. A move towards co-development with larger upfronts: partly confirmed.
    Multi-asset alliances and joint discovery are now standard in the largest deals, and a single upfront reached USD 1.2bn. Upfronts, at around 6% of headline value, are in line with industry norms and rising in absolute terms.
  5. The NewCo model is emerging: confirmed.
    NewCos have moved from novelty to a standard structure, and the Nasdaq IPOs of Kailera (April) and Braveheart Bio (August) show that investors will fund them.
  6. Geopolitics is the key risk: confirmed, with a twist.
    Washington’s first concrete proposal spares pure licensing but targets equity stakes, while Beijing has started to restrict exports of its own biotech platforms. Policy risk is now two-sided.

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Why does China matter?

  • Scale of innovation.
    About a quarter of innovative drug candidates in active development worldwide originate from China. In the first half of 2025, 46% of new molecules entering human trials came from Chinese companies, against about 17% a decade earlier (Goldman Sachs).
  • Leadership in key technologies.
    Over the past two and a half years, Chinese companies accounted for about 70% of global antibody-drug conjugate (ADC) development and about 60% of bispecific antibody development (Goldman Sachs). They are also strong in CAR-T, PD-1 antibodies, siRNA and AI-driven drug discovery. For Western companies with strong rare disease franchises, Chinese science could become an additional source of early-stage assets, provided licenses are backed by clinical data that ex-China regulators will accept.
  • Speed and cost.
    Regulatory reforms have shortened review times sharply, patient recruitment is fast and early-stage development costs are well below Western levels. As a result, Chinese companies generate clinical proof of concept faster and more cheaply than most Western peers.
  • State backing.
    A new five-year plan for the pharmaceutical industry, published by MIIT and other ministries on 18 September 2026, sets targets for 2030: at least 25% of the world’s first-in-class drugs, at least five products with global annual sales above USD 1bn, 50 companies with annual revenue above CNY 10bn, and innovative-drug growth of more than 20% a year.
  • Record approvals at home.
    China’s regulator (NMPA) approved a record 76 innovative drugs in 2025 and another 38 in the first half of 2026, 31 of them developed by domestic companies.
  • A maturing capital market.
    Hong Kong has reopened as a funding venue. In 2025, 13 biotech companies raised about USD 6.4bn there, against four listings in 2024, and large follow-on offerings came from Innovent, Akeso and 3SBio. Healthcare companies make up about a fifth of the more than 300 pending listing applications.

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2026 dealmaking: another record year

By early October, Chinese companies had signed out-licensing deals worth USD 139.4bn, already more than 2025’s full-year record of about USD 136bn (PharmCube). Only about USD 8bn of this was paid upfront. China now supplies 58% of global licensing deal value, up from 48% in 2025 (Locust Walk), and was the seller in eight of the ten largest deals worldwide in the first half. The flow continued into the fourth quarter, with Abogen–Novartis in October.

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Largest deals of 2026 (by headline value)

Date Chinese company → Partner Upfront
(USD)
Total potential value
(USD)
Area
Jan CSPC → AstraZeneca 1.2bn up to 18.5bn Long-acting peptides for obesity and diabetes, plus AI-enabled discovery platforms
May Hengrui → Bristol Myers Squibb 600m up to ~15.2bn Several drugs plus joint discovery
May Innovent → Pfizer 650m ~10.5bn ADCs and multispecific antibodies
Feb Innovent → Eli Lilly 350m ~8.85bn Oncology and immunology (discovery stage)
Oct Abogen → Novartis 575m up to 7.8bn mRNA therapy for autoimmune disease, plus option on platform assets
Jan RemeGen → AbbVie 650m ~5.6bn PD-1/VEGF bispecific antibody
Feb Ribo → Madrigal 60m ~4.5bn siRNA for MASH (fatty liver disease)

Sources: company announcements; Life Science Daily deal tracker. Total values include development, regulatory and sales milestones.

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Patterns:

  • Broader therapeutic and technology mix.
    Beyond oncology ADCs and bispecific antibodies, 2026 deals cover obesity (CSPC), siRNA (Ribo, CSPC, SanegeneBio, SiranBio), mRNA (Abogen), oral small molecules such as a KRAS G12D inhibitor (SciBrunch–Merck) and AI-discovered molecules (Insilico with Eli Lilly and SK Biopharmaceuticals).
  • Larger, multi-asset deals.
    Partners now license portfolios and research platforms, not just single drugs. Innovent–Pfizer and Hengrui–BMS each combine several programmes with joint discovery.
  • Repeat buyers.
    Eli Lilly has signed at least four deals above USD 1bn with Chinese partners this year (Innovent, Insilico, Haisco, InnoCare), and AstraZeneca three (CSPC twice, Dizal). Pfizer, BMS, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Merck, GSK, Roche/Genentech and AbbVie are also active.

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Who captures the value?

At around 6% of headline value, upfront payments to Chinese licensors are in line with the industry as a whole, where upfronts have fallen close to their lowest share since 2017 (J.P. Morgan). In absolute terms they are rising. Most of the value remains tied to milestones, giving Chinese licensors significant upside as their programmes advance.

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Chinese companies are also using three levers to keep more of that upside:

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  • Co-development and retained rights.
    Licensors increasingly keep Greater China rights, co-develop with their partners or bundle a research platform into the deal, as in CSPC–AstraZeneca and Hengrui–BMS.
  • NewCos.
    The licensor takes cash plus an equity stake, often 20–30%, in a new US-based company funded by Western investors. Hengrui’s GLP-1 NewCo Kailera listed on Nasdaq in April 2026, followed by Braveheart Bio (cardiac myosin inhibitor) in August, up 66% on its first day. At first-day closing prices, Hengrui’s stakes in the two companies were worth about USD 520m.
  • Going global alone.
    The most advanced players, such as BeOne Medicines (formerly BeiGene), are building their own late-stage and commercial capabilities outside China.

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Western pharma, meanwhile, is buying options rather than companies. Licensing gives access to Chinese science without owning Chinese assets, which also limits political exposure.

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Michel Le Bars, Sector Lead Healthcare & Lifesciences: “China is now a core source of new drugs for Western pharma. Billion-dollar headlines need careful reading: as across the industry, about 6% is paid upfront and the rest depends on milestones. With Washington targeting equity stakes and Beijing guarding its technology, deal structure, IP and data provenance are becoming as important to valuation as the science itself.”

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Rising political risk, on both sides

  • Washington: from rhetoric to rules.
    The BIOSECURE Act, enacted through the FY2026 defence bill (NDAA), restricts federal procurement from designated Chinese ‘biotechnology companies of concern’. The Biotech Investment National Security Act (BINSA), introduced in the House in June and the Senate in August, would explicitly cover licensing deals, but has not yet left committee. On 22 October, the Treasury proposed adding biotechnology to its outbound investment programme as a prohibited sector. The proposal targets equity investments, not pure licensing deals. Comments close on 7 December, and a final rule is due by March 2027.
  • Pressure on clinical data.
    In August, members of the House China Select Committee asked the FDA to stop accepting Chinese trial data unless the site had been audited by the FDA within the previous 12 months. The committee is also investigating the China trial arrangements of five drugmakers. This reinforces the shift towards US trial sites for pivotal studies.
  • Beijing: guarding its own technology.
    In October, China’s commerce and science ministries proposed export controls on five biomedicine technologies, including process platforms for cell and gene therapy and siRNA, and methods for discovering new drug targets. Licensing to foreign partners and contract research would remain possible, but outright sales of these platforms would be barred.
  • What it means for European dealmakers.
    The US measures require a US nexus. A European buyer with no US persons or US capital in a deal falls outside them as currently drafted, but US subsidiaries, employees or investors can bring a deal into scope. NewCo and joint-venture structures with equity components are the most exposed, while pure licences are spared for now.

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Conclusion

Our view

China has become a structural part of the global biopharma pipeline, not a cyclical opportunity. Strong science, speed, low cost and state support should keep licensing activity high into 2027, even if headline values level off. Three developments will shape the next phase: whether US rules extend from equity investments to licensing itself, whether Chinese companies succeed in keeping more of the value through co-development, NewCos and their own global ambitions; and whether China’s domestic market starts to pay for innovation.

For European pharma and investors, China is now a core source of new drugs. The winners will combine early access to Chinese science with deal structures that can withstand geopolitical risk: robust governance, clear IP and data provenance, US-relevant clinical plans, change-in-law protection and flexible options for later stages. In valuations, headline deal values should be risk-adjusted rigorously: what counts is the upfront, the probability of reaching each milestone, and the regulatory exposure of the structure.

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What we did not fully anticipate

We expected growth, but not that 2026 would overtake 2025’s full-year record before October. The breadth of innovation has also widened: China now supplies obesity, RNA, mRNA and AI-discovered drugs, not only oncology. Political momentum has accelerated as well, but in a different shape than expected. Washington’s first concrete proposal spares pure licensing and targets equity, which puts NewCos rather than classic licences in focus. And Beijing has begun to treat its biotech platforms as strategic assets to be controlled. Policy risk is now the single biggest uncertainty for the model, and it comes from both sides.

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Read the report: Healthcare & Lifesciences Report 2026 – M&A Insights and Outlook

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